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SUMMARY
Cooperative or altruistic behavior in the absence of egoistic incentives is
an issue that has puzzled many social scientists. In this book an attempt
is made to gain more insight into such behavior for a specific type of
situation: the social dilemma. Social dilemmas are defined here as
situations in which: a.) each player within the game has an option that
guarantees him a higher payoff than all other available options; and b.)
there is a configuration of choices that offers every player a higher
payoff than the payoff resulting when all choose their dominant option.
When the game is played only once, and behavior remains anonymous,
there appear to be no egoistic incentives for refraining from choosing
the dominant option. However, previous experimental research has
shown that even under these conditions a considerable depree of
cooperative behavior may be found.
In chapter one, two generally suggested causes of non-egoistic
behavior are introduced: altruism and norms. Altruism refers to (non-
instrumental) concern for the well-being of others. Norms refer to
feelings/cognitions about how one ought to behave in a specific
situation. Two specifications are made. First, altruism is defined as
group-altruism. Consequently, also from the altruistic point of view the
own payoff is of interest: besides being an individual, one is also a
group member. Second, the norms that are considered are social justice
norms. This type of norm is not directed at promoting group welfare,
but may do so as a side-effect.
Chapter two starts by asking which of the two suggested causes,
altruism or norrns, offers a better point of departure for a theory of non-
egoistic behavior in social dilemmas. In studies 1 and 2, valuing
adherence to an equal-sharing norm and concem for the collective
payoff are compared as possible motives in addition to own gain
maximization. The results of the two studies are (more) supportive of
the normative than of the altruistic explanation. However, since the
theorizing was still very informal, this conclusion is open to criticism.
That is why in chapter three both the altruistic and the normative line
of explanation are formalized. The altruistic model draws heavily on the
work of Margolis (1982). Two central features of Margolis' model are:
a.) the utility of an alternative for the group and for oneself are not
combined additively, but in an interactive function: the (weighted) ratio
of the two marginal utilities is assumed to be important; b.) the weight
that an individual assigns to self-interest in this ratio is assumed to be a
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positive function of the portion of his budget that he has already spent
altruistically.
The basic assumption of the normative model, which we named
the Constrained Egoism Model, is that people value fair own behavior.
This means that exploiting the other players in the social dilemma is
accompanied by (immaterial) costs. It is assumed that the disutility of
violating other players entitlements is proportional to the degree of
violation. However, giving others more than they are entitled to is
assumed to have no additional utility from a social justice point of view.
Like Margolis' model, the Constrained Egoism Model also assumes that
own payoffs are important. The two utility arguments are combined in
an additive function.
In study 3, two sets of conflicting hypotheses are tested. Whereas
Margolis' model predicts that, all else being equal, people will behave
more altruistically to the degree that such behavior has more positive
consequences for the Soup, the Constrained Egoism Model predicts that
the reverse effect will occur. The larger the benefits that one's own
altruistic behavior bestows on others, the lower the level of altruistic
behavior that is needed to reciprocate the benefits that one received flom
them. Obviously, the Constrained Egoism Model also predicts that, all
else being equal, people will behave more altruistically to the degree
that others' altruistic behavior has more positive consequences for
oneself. Margolis' model leads to the prediction that the consequences
of others' behavior for oneself will not affect own behavior.
The results of study 3 support the Constrained Egoism Model to a
much larger degree than Margolis' model. The focus shifts therefore
from comparing the two models to elaborating the Constrained Egoism
Model. In chapter four, a finding that both models did not predict is
used as a stafting-point for this elaboration. In study 3, the overall
degree of altruistic behavior was lower in asymmetric dilemmas than in
their symmetric counterparts. It is suggested that more than one fairness
criterion may be appropriate in a specific situation. Whereas in
symmetric games different criteria lead to the same prescription for fair
own behavior, in asymmetric dilemmas the prescriptions are likely to
differ. This leads to normative ambiguity: uncertainty about which
fairness criterion one should adhere to. An additional assumption is that
in case of normative ambiguity, egoistic criterion selection will occur:
people will tend to adhere to the fairness criterion that requires less
altruistic behavior.
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An interesting feature of the Constrained Egoism Model is that it
suggests that one's behavior will not involve a trade-off between profit
maximizing and adhering to a fairness criterion, nor between adhering to
the different fairness criteria themselves. This implies that a post-hoc
categorization may be performed in which people are classified
according to the option that they seem to have chosen: maximizing
one's profit, adhering to a self-advantageous faimess criterion, or
adhering to a more generous fairness criterion. If the model is correct,
this categorization should provide a good fit. In symmetric dilemmas the
categorization may be performed without specifying the fairness criteria
that are involved, because they all prescribe matching the (average)
degree of altruistic behavior expected of others. In asymmetric
dilemmas, however, such a categorization depends critically on which
criteria are considered admissable.
An attempt is made to specify the set of admissable criteria for
two types of social dilemmas. The first type of dilemma is a production/
investment dilemma in which faimess in exchange is important, while
the second type is a consumptiorVresource dilemma in which faimess in
distribution is important. The theoretical analysis suggests that two
criteria will be considered admissable for each type of dilemma. One of
the two criteria focuses on the consequences of one's behavior, the
other on the intention that the behavior expresses. The two-criteria
solution does rather well as a post-hoc explanation of the symmetry-
asymmetry effect in study 3, in which an investment dilemma was
employed and where the asymmetry was located in the beneficence of a
player's altruistic behavior for the collective.
Since the set of criteria is not limited to a specific type of
asymmetry within the type of dilemma, in chapter five it was
investigated whether the same set also performed well in investment
dilemmas with other types of asymmetry. In study 4, asymmefy in the
costs of altruistic behavior was investigated, and in study 5 asymmetry
in the size of the players' budgets. The results are generally supportive,
with one exception. Although subjects did seem to limit themselves to
the options that the model allowed, the egoistic criterion selection
hypothesis was only partially supported: in some cases the subjects who
did not opt for profit were divided about equally between the two fair
options. A new finding is that in the asymmetric dilemmas the
proportion of profit maximizers is higher than in comparable symmetric
dilemmas. It is hypothesized that normative ambiguity not only (often)
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leads to egoistic criterion seiection, but also lowers the salience of
fairness considerations.
In chapter six the solution for the other type of dilemma, the
resource dilemma, is investigated. Furthermore it is tested whether the
asymmetry itself leads to a lower degree of altruistic behavior, or if this
effect is indeed mediated by processes triggered by normative
ambiguity: egoistic criterion selection and a lowered salience of faimess
considerations. In study 6, asymmetry as well as symmetry in the value
of resource units was investigated. The results of this study are highly
supportive of the Constrained Egoism Model. The fit of the poslhoc
categorization is satisfactory. Also, when the asymmetry did not result in
normative ambiguity, the average degree of altruistic behavior was the
same as in a symmetric dilemma in which one's resource units had the
same value. Furthermore, in the conditions in which the asymmetry did
result in normative ambiguity, the proportion of profit maximizers was
higher and egoistic criterion selection occurred.
Chapter seyen concentrates on an issue that repeatedly turned up
in previous chapters, but did not receive full attention there: the
difference between hurting others and not helping them. A new type of
ambiguity, application ambiguity, is introduced. Application ambiguity
implies that it is not clear whether fairness is an appropriate issue at all
in the situation at hand, as opposed to the question which fairness
criteria are appropriate. This type of ambiguity is assumed to be present
in help-dilemmas, but not in hurt-dilemmas. Furthermore, even if people
consider fairness criteria appropriate, in help-dilemmas coordinating
one's behavior to that of the others (a requirement o give others their
due and no more) is assumed to be more difficult, on account of the
absence of a focal point for tacit coordination. Such a point is assumed
to be present in hurt-dilemmas. Predictions that are based on these
h)?otheses are tested in study 7. The results are suggestive, but not
conclusive.
Finally, in chapter eight a more extensive summary of the
studies and their results is given. The relevance of the conclusions,
based on all seven studies, for the emergence of non-egoistic motives is
briefly evaluated. The Constrained Egoism Model is also compared with
another recently proposed theory on non-egoistic behavior, that of
Caporael et al. (1989).
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